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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Donald A. Gillies*
Search and Seizure Incident to Arrest for
Minor Traffic Violations-Police officers noticed a car parked illegally, blocking access to
a beach area, and questioned the occupants
for the purpose of determining why the vehicle
was parked in that position. While doing so,
the officers observed a substance that looked
like marijuana on the driver's shirt. On the
basis of this suspicion the car and the occupants
were searched and quantities of marijuana
were discovered. Then the defendant was
arrested. Over the objection that the evidence
was illegally seized and therefore inadmissible
because the officers did not have probable
cause to search either the car or its occupants,
the conviction for possession of narcotics was
sustained, for the "circumstances disclosed a
reasonable search and seizure incident to a
valid arrest." People v. Martin, 295 P. 2d 33
(Cal. App. 1956).
However, where the defendant had failed
to signal for a turn off the main highway onto
a secondary road, in violation of the statutory
duty to signal, a subsequent search and seizure
was declared unreasonable. In this case, after
the officers stopped the car and examined defendant's driver's license, they searched the
car, without any warrant, finding certain
bottles of whiskey, the presence of which constituted an unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor under the state law. The court
granted a motion to suppress the evidence on
the theory that "ordinarily a minor traffic
violation will not support a search and seizure."
Testimony by the officers had disclosed that
they always suspected that automobiles going
down secondary roads contained whiskey. The
arrest, therefore, was predicated solely upon
suspicion. Since this search was not incident to
a lawful arrest or upon probable cause of the
commission of a felony, it was held to have
* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University
School of Law.

violated the state constitution. Ellsworth v.
State, 295 P. 2d 296 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
Radar Evidence Will Sustain Conviction for
Speeding If Proper Elements of Proof Are
Presented-The defendant was charged with
speeding on the basis of evidence obtained
through the use of a radar unit. In the Magistrate's court the defendant pleaded not guilty
and challenged the use of radar as a reliable
means of ascertaining the speed of an automobile. In particular, the question was raised
whether the accuracy of a radar unit would be
affected by the presence of other moving
vehicles in close proximity to the suspected
vehicle. Testimony established that the patrolmen who had operated the radar unit had been
given an intensive four month course in the
technical aspects of radar and, in addition, a
further training period of two months in the
operational use of the machine. The radar net
in this case involved two squad cars; the car
containing the radar was placed to give the
operator a clear view both of moving vehicles
and of the arresting squad car which was stationed some distance down the road. The unit,
installed in the rear of the squad car, emitted
a beam which, when reflected off of the suspected vehicle, returned to the unit. This
reaction registered on a dial which indicated
the speed of the moving car. A third instrument
graphically recorded the evidence of the speed
of the vehicles. Further testimony indicated
that if the radar unit was not in the proper
position the radar may record the speed of
cars going in the opposite direction and erroneously attribute such speed to the suspected
vehicle; while this tended to support the defendant's theory, it was rebutted by a showing
that accurate results will almost always occur
if the radar car is in the proper position. When
the machine indicated a speeding vehicle, the
officer would phone the description of the
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speeding car ahead to the arresting squad car
which would then apprehend the violator.
The sus;;ected car was in view of the officer in
the radar car from the time it was docked
until it was stopped by the second squad car.
It was also standard procedure to test the
accuracy of the radar unit at frequent intervals
by means of a police car with a calibrated
speedometer passing through the radar beam.
In addition, other testimony established that
weakening of the radar tubes through prolonged use will result in the registering of a
lower speed and produce an error in the defendant's favor. On the basis of this evidence
the defendant was convicted of speeding. The
New York Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and accepted the use of radar as a
proper instrument for measuring the speed of
vehicles, provided that adequate proof was
presented to the court. People v. Sachs, 147
N.Y.S.2d 801 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1956).
In the future, the court said, the results of
radar may be introduced in evidence without
the use of expert testimony, such as was necessary in the instant case. However, the court
set out nine elements of proof which must be
established in every case before evidence obtained by radar will be accepted. The prosecution must show: (1) that the radar car was
properly set up in its detecting location; (2)
that the radar instruments were working;
(3) that the apprehending car was set in its
own location; (4) that both cars were visible
to each other at a reasonable distance; (5) that
a vehicle equipped with a calibrated speedometer had been used at the beginning and the
end of the tour to test the accuracy of the
radar set; (6) that the graph sheet shows the
results of these tests; (7) that the speedometer
on the testing vehicle was accurate; (8) that
the radar car officer observed the speeding
vehicle as well as any other vehicle and accurately described the speeding vehicle; and (9)
that the proper defendant was arrested and
served with the summons. The court, after
setting out this procedure, declared: "it would
seem that the defendant under this method of
proof is fully protected in his rights."
See Dielze v. State, 75 N.W.2d 95 (Neb.

1956), where a somewhat less substantial
foundation was held proper to sustain the
conviction.
Enlarged Color Photographs Are No More
Prejudicial Than Ordinary Ones-The nude
body of a fifteen year old girl was found in a
garage; she had been raped and strangled. The
defendant was arrested that same day, questioned at length and finally confessed to the
killing. However, he repudiated his confession,
pleaded not guilty and was tried before a jury,
receiving a sentence of life imprisonment. At
the trial the medical examiner, a pathologist
attached to the Harvard Medical School and
the state police, testified to the results of the
autopsy he had performed, illustrating what
he had seen by the use of enlarged color photographs produced upon a screen. Other evidence
connecting the accused to the crime was produced by an expert chemist attached to the
state department of public safety. He applied
benzidin tests to the body of the defendant,
with his consent, in an effort to discover the
presence of human blood which may not have
been seen upon "gross examination." The tests
showed blood on the defendant's left wrist,
his upper left arm, the back of his neck and
the entire area of his groin. Similar tests on
clothing also showed the presence of blood.
This blood was consistent with the blood of the
murdered girl, but not with that of the defendant.
The appeal following the conviction raised
numerous exceptions, including objections to
the use of the enlarged color photographs to
illustrate the pathologist's testimony on the
ground that they were inflammatory and prejudicial. The court rejected defendant's objections, referring first to the fact that no question had been raised as to the identification of
the slides or as to their being a fair representation of the conditions which the pathologist
discovered in the autopsy. The court then
pointed out that no cases had been found
where the admissibility of photographs depended upon a distinction between the use of
ordinary photographs and the use of colored
ones. Aside from prejudice no reason for such
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a distinction could be made. It was noted that
since "all the evidence in this case was such as
to indicate that the crime was committed with
such extreme atrocity and violence, these
slides could add little to inflame or prejudice
the jury." Commonwealth v. Makarewicz,
132 N.E.2d 294 (Mass. 1956).

case of the bookie jargon the court deemed the
failure to qualify an expert to explain the
normal meaning of the expressions was error,
for it "permitted the (jury) to speculate as to
their meaning."

Identification of Voices Heard Through
Wire-Tapping and Explanation of Bookie
jargon Deemed Inadequate for ConvictionUnder the authority of court orders a special
investigator for the local district attorney
listened in on over one hundred telephone conversations among the defendants during some
two weeks' time for six hours each day. While
he was doing this wire-tapping, the investigator
was "busily making pencilled notes and attempting to record the substance of the conversations on the telephones." Some three
months later the defendants were brought to
trial for conspiracy and book making. At this
time the investigator identified all nine defendants as possessing voices he had heard in
the wire-tapping, although admitting he did
not know most of the persons to whom the
voices belonged. A further element in the
prosecution was the explanation of the conversations thus recorded. These conversations had
been carried on in a jargon peculiar to the
business of book making. Although the jargon
was in English, it was unfamiliar to the judge
and presumably to the laymen on the jury.
However, the judge did not require, not did
the prosecution present, an expert to explain
the meaning of the expressions used. The New
York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions for substantial error in these two elements
of proof. People v. Abelsonz, 132 N.E.2d 884
(N. Y. 1956).
With regard to the identification of the
voices of the telephone conversants, the court
held that since there was no individual identification, but only a collective, or general,
description, the recognition of the voices heard
over the tap by the investigator "falls below
the standards necessary to rebut the presumption of innocence and to prove the guilt of
defendants beyond a reasonable doubt." In the

In an Arson Trial Testimony Relating to the
Burning Time of a Candle Is Competent although not Based on Experiments Conducted
Under Substantially Similar Conditions-About
2 o'clock A.M. a fire broke out in the defendants' house. At the time no one was at
home, the family having left on a vacation
around 4:30 the previous afternoon. When the
fire was finally extinguished, an investigation
was made by the firemen and police officers,
whose suspicions had been aroused by the
incendiary character of the fire and the smell
of gasoline. The search disclosed a small candle
holder among a lot of debris which contained
fuel oil and gasoline. The state presented the
theory that the fire was a delayed one, and
that a candle had been used for the purpose of
starting it. During the trial the prosecution
called an expert witness who had conducted
certain tests as to the burning time of candles.
Over the objection of incompetency, irrelevancy, and immateriality the witness was
allowed to testify that he had performed tests
with candles of similar composition to some
found in the ruins, and that from these tests
he had found that the burning time of candles
was at the rate of "approximately one inch
every two hours." The Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected the defendants' contentions
of error on the objections and affirmed the
conviction. State v. Molitor, 289 P. 2d 1090
(Ore. 1955)
After stating that the burning time of the
candle was "hardly a matter for expert testimony", the court continued: "Having established the probability of use of a candle in
producing the delayed fire, testimony respecting the burning time of particular candles was
not necessary to the state's case, yet it cannot
be said that such evidence was wholly incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial ... "

(For other recent case abstracts see
pages 231-236)
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The objection that the state did not first show
that the experiments had been conducted
under conditions substantially similar to those
prevailing at the time and place of the fact in
controversy was dismissed for two reasons.
First, the defendants asserted no such ground
of objection at the time of trial; therefore, it
could not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Furthermore, the court stated, the tests made
by the expert "with respect to the burning
time of candles are not experiments of the type
necessary to bring them within the rule" that
experiments must be conducted under substantially similar conditions.
Extent of Judicial Review over Civil Service
Commission Discharge Orders of PolicemenFour cases contesting the discharges of patrolmen by the Civil Service Commission of the
City of Chicago for misconduct raised the
issue of the scope of judicial review of the
discharge orders. In Nolling v. Civil Service
Com'Wn of City of Chicago, 129 N.E. 2d 236
(Ill. App. 1955), the Commission had found
the patrolman guilty of abandoning his post
without permission and of failing to report an
accident that he was subsequently involved in.
In Foreman v. Civil Service Commission, 129
N.E. 2d 245 (Ill.
App. 1955), the officer had
also been found to have abandoned his post
without permission. In Martin v. Civil Service
Commission, 129 N.E. 2d 248 (Ill.
App. 1955),
two policemen had been discharged for taking
money from an arrested person, keeping part
and failing to turn in the rest for inventorying
until two days later. The officer in Watkins
v. Civil Service Commission, 129 N.E. 2d 254
(Ill. App. 1955), was discharged for permitting
a prisoner to escape while in his custody. In
all four cases the trial court (the original reviewing court) had reversed the orders, holding
that the Commission's decisions were "harsh
and unwarranted and therefore contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence." The Appellate
Division reversed the trial court's reinstatement of the patrolmen without bac& pay, in
effect a reduction of the penalty from discharge
to suspension, holding that in all the cases
the Commission's findings of fact were fully

supported by the evidence. The trial court in
each case had not based its decision on the
grounds that the findings were actually against
the manifest weight of the evidence, but rather
that the punishment of discharge was too
severe. In other words, what the trial court
had measured "was not the evidence but the
gravity of the charge against the severity of
the punishment."
The issues before the Appellate Court required an examination of the Commission's
power or authority to suspend the patrolmen.
If this power were not present, then the trial
court certainly could not find the Commission
in error for failing to exercise a power the
commission did not possess. It was found that
section 4 of the Cities Civil Service Act, ILL.
RFEv. STAT. c. 24,J, §4 (1955), provided for two
kinds of punishment, suspension of not more
than 30 days by the appointing officer or discharge by the Commission; thus, the Commission did not have the authority to suspend.
The ultimate issue, therefore, is to what extent
may the trial court ignore the action of the
Commission by reducing the degree of punishment even though the original decision was
based on the manifest weight of the evidence.
The trial court, as the initial court of review,
is limited to determining whether the Commisslon has followed the proper rules of procedure,
whether the findings of fact are against the
manifest weight of the evidence, whether the
Commission has jurisdiction, and whether the
ruling was arbitrary or capricious.
Since none of these limited powers of review
would support the decision of the trial court,
the only theory for the reversal of the Commission order was that the trial court thought that
it had the power to modify these orders. In
rejecting this idea the Appellate Court found
that the question of discipline of the City
police force should be left entirely in the hands
of the Commission and the Police Commissioner. They are experts in the field and they
alone have the responsibility to the public for
maintaining an efficient and well disciplined
force. The police force was compared to a
military establishment where strict discipline
is an absolute requirement to efficient opera-
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tion. To substitute judicial judgment for
executive judgment in these matters would
only create chaos.
In conclusion, the opinions remarked that
evidently there was a "marked difference of
understanding between the appellate courts
and the original reviewing courts with respect
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to the limitations of review in this class of
cases," citing Note, 47 Nw. L. REv. 660
(1952), and stated categorically that it is not
only a matter of law but also a matter of public
policy that the hiring and discharge of Civil
Service employees remains an executive function.

